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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Constitution of 1988 reinstated the democratic rule 
of law in Brazil. Based on fundamental rights, the “Citizen’s Con-
stitution” shaped the model of a welfare State, which objectives con-
sist in the construction of a free, just and solidary society, the erad-
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ication of poverty and substandard living conditions and the promo-
tion of the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, 
color, age and any other forms of discrimination. From this context, 
the constitutional idealization of family democracy emerges, specif-
ically represented in this paper by the recognition of civil union be-
tween people of the same sex as family units. The democratization 
of civil law in matters of family law, beyond the interpretation of the 
legal norms in force according to the Constitution, demands the un-
derstanding of what constitutes each individual (or group) that is 
recipient of the principles of affection and solidarity. In the historic 
2011 ruling, the Federal Supreme Court equated same-sex unions 
and opposite-sex unions as to rights and duties. However, the Court 
failed to advance in the unavoidable debate on gender issues. 
 
Keywords: Brazil, same-sex marriage, civil unions, Brazilian Con-
stitution  
I. INTRODUCTION  
To discourse on Brazilian civil law in such ample dimensions 
requires a demarcation of the thematic scope of this paper. Based on 
the “historic performance” of the Federal Supreme Court1 (STF) in 
2011, we intend to highlight the long walk to democratization of the 
civil law in Brazil. Although the end result of the Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality2 42773 (ADI 4277) ruling was important to 
                                                                                                             
 1. Supremo Tribunal Federal, Institucional, available at https://perma.cc 
/J9A9-XZ36 (last updated Jan. 13, 2011) (“The Supremo Tribunal Federal [Fed-
eral Supreme Court] is the apex body of the Brazilian Judiciary, and its primary 
responsibility is to safeguard the Constitution, as defined in art 102 of the Federal 
Constitution.”).  
 2. Supremo Tribunal Federal, Glossário Jurídico, available at 
https://perma.cc/CR78-X3BW: 
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI): Action that aims to declare 
that a law or part of it is unconstitutional, that is, contrary to the Federal 
Constitution. The ADI is one of the tools of what jurists call ‘concen-
trated control’ of constitutionality of laws (or abstract control). In other 
words, it is a direct contestation to the norm itself in theory. Another 
form of concentrated control is the Declaratory Action of Constitution-
ality. The opposite of the ‘concentrated control’ is ‘diffuse control’ in 
which unconstitutional laws are questioned indirectly through the analy-
sis of concrete situations (our translation). 
 3. ADI 4277, STF, 05.05.2011, https://perma.cc/FLY5-UFAV. 
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broadening the legal concept of family in the country, as to the very 
substance of the claim, the decision is found wanting. 
By this, we intend to say that to grant rights to a particular mar-
ginalized group within a society does not immediately mean accept-
ing its members as citizens. In the present case, the ADI 4277 was 
unanimously upheld by the justices who at the time formed the main 
Brazilian Court.4 There was the recognition of the continuous, pub-
lic and lasting (stable) union between same-sex partners as a family. 
However, little headway was made in the treatment of the homosex-
ual individual as a person.5 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to demonstrate that, since the Federal 
Supreme Court proposed to play a key role in Brazil’s democratic 
process,6 the Court has repeatedly been asked to extract renewed 
meanings of the normative text of the 1988 Constitution in areas of 
extreme political and social sensitivity. This has renewed efforts to 
affirm civil rights.  
The concept of person derives from law’s constant search for 
protection of the human civilizational form (person), which is not 
preconceived, but must be understood historically in the experience 
of this endeavor.7 Hence, to speak of existential rights, “preroga-
tives designed to protect the self-construction power of each existing 
person.”8 However, in order for each individual to have access to 
self-development, it is not enough to grant rights to minorities, as 
occurred here with the recognition of same-sex civil unions. 
                                                                                                             
 4. Justice Dias Toffoli recused himself. 
 5. BERNARD EDELMAN, LA PERSONNE EN DANGER 45-46 (Presses Universi-
taires de France 1999) “an individual who has internalized law to the point of 
discovering it in himself” (our translation). 
 6. This active stance stems from representation flaws in the democratic pro-
cess, particularly by legislative omission. 
 7. Lucas Abreu Barroso, O direito das famílias e a crise da autonomia do 
direito no horizonte humano e cultural da pós-modernidade, 49 REVISTA CRÍTICA 
DO DIREITO (2013). 
 8. RICARDO RABINOVICH-BERKMAN, 1 ¿CÓMO SE HICIERON LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS? UN VIAJE POR LA HISTORIA DE LOS PRINCIPALES DERECHOS DE LAS 
PERSONAS 176 (Didot 2013).  
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Velten, in his imposing doctoral dissertation on the subject, 
leads the reader to an unsettling conclusion: the Supreme Court did 
not recognize, in a broad sense, the social identity of those involved 
in the ADI 4277. The author convincingly argues that it is because 
“the Court demonstrated attachment to an individual ethics, depend-
ent on personal and intrinsic factors, typically Aristotelian, and also 
an impregnated disposition (habitus) to become the protagonist in 
the distribution of rights through the manipulation of concepts (bri-
colage).”9 
The dissertation concludes that counter-hegemonic discourse 
served as the basis for the decision. Velten also demonstrates that 
allegations such as prejudice, vulnerability and historical misfortune 
(from Nietzsche’s work) serve to evidence a nihilistic devenir, sug-
gesting that the arguments always lead to the same philosophical 
locus, therefore half way to the acceptance of the complexity that 
marks contemporary society.10 
II. THE 1998 FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW RIGHTS IN 
BRAZIL  
The promulgation of the current Constitution of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil, on October 5, 1988, marked both the end of a 
turbulent time in the recent history of the country and the beginning 
of the (re)structuring process of the State regarding political, eco-
nomic and social aspects. One of its main consequences has been 
ensuring institutional stability and democracy for more than two 
decades—the first since the proclamation of the Republic in the year 
1889.11 
                                                                                                             
 9. Paulo O. Velten, O ser e o Sujeito de Direitos: Uma Análise do Contra-
majoritarismo no Supremo Tribunal Federal (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Universidade Estácio de Sá) (on file with author). 
 10. Id. at 123 et seq. 
 11. LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO, O NOVO DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 
BRASILEIRO: CONTRIBUIÇÕES PARA A CONSTRUÇÃO TEÓRICA E PRÁTICA DA 
JURISDIÇÃO CONSTITUCIONAL NO BRASIL 26 (Forúm 2014). 
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Politically, the Federal Constitution of 1988 ended a transition, 
which begun in the late 1970s. It was the transition from an author-
itarian, intolerant, violent state12—built around the policies of a 
civil-military dictatorship, established by the 1964 coup d’état—to 
the rule of law which is democratic, eminently constitutional, and 
based primarily on fundamental rights. 
Thus, the Basic Law of 1988, which came to be known as the 
“Citizen’s Constitution,”13 outlined in its text the formatting of a 
welfare state—its roots were engendered in the political structure of 
the country by the Constitution of 1946—which survived, despite 
defeats, the authoritarian Constitutions of 1967 and 1969. 
Economically, the 1988 Federal Constitution, by protecting stra-
tegic sectors of the Brazilian economy,14 such as mineral production 
and telecommunications, emerged against neoliberal policies that 
were taking shape in the Western world in the late 1980s.These pro-
tectionist provisions were the first barriers removed by a Brazilian 
government that favored economic openness (1994-2002). This hap-
pened through the second round of constitutional amendments ap-
proved by Congress15 in order to allow the insertion of the Brazilian 
economy into the globalized world. 
Socially, the Federal Constitution, by providing rights that are 
typical of a social welfare state, such as access to education, health 
and housing,16 brought hope to a country overrun with pockets of 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id.  
 13. This expression was popularized by Deputy Ulysses Guimarães, the 
Chairman of the National Constituent Assembly (1987-1988), to whom this new 
Political Charter would be the recovery of citizenship for the Brazilian people, 
who had been deprived of the right to choose their own President, among other 
rights, for twenty-five years. 
 14. PAULO BONAVIDES, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 675 (24th ed., 
Malheiros 2009).  
 15. Id. at 675-77.  
 16. art. 6: “Education, health, food, work, housing, leisure, security, social 
security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to the destitute 
are social rights, as set forth by this Constitution,” CONSTITUTION OF THE 
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL (3rd ed., IstvanVajda, Patricia Zimbres, Vanira 
Tavares de Souza trans., Brası́lia: Documentation and Information Center, Pub-
lishing Coordination, Chamber of Deputies 2010) [hereinafter CF 88] (including 
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poverty, both in cities and in the countryside. Because the Brazilian 
population is markedly poor and plagued by a historical unequal in-
come distribution, its members could not identify with the provi-
sions of their fundamental law, which still remains partly the case 
today. 
If on one hand, the Federal Constitution emerges with a prospec-
tive character, since its main guideline consists of the construction 
of a new political, economic and social reality, one should also em-
phasize the democratic environment in which it was conceived. 
First and foremost, the process that culminated in the promulga-
tion of the 1988 Federal Constitution is the result of political will, 
embodied in a National Constituent Assembly, whose representa-
tives, deputies and senators, were democratically elected in 1986 
and gathered sovereignly during the years 1987 and 1988 for its 
preparation. 
Although there is a consensus that the National Constituent As-
sembly17 had a conservative profile, this decision-making forum 
managed to be democratic and progressive at the same time. These 
characteristics may seem contrary to the ideological lines of most 
constituent deputies, but together with such ideologies, they portray 
accurately the striking features of the entire Brazilian society of yes-
terday and today, with all its uneasiness, worries, instabilities, defi-
ciencies, and political practice.18 
The National Constituent Assembly was marked by the direct 
participation of citizens who submitted popular proposals on con-
troversial but essential issues for the country’s development, such as 
stability of employment and land reform.19 
                                                                                                             
constitutional text of October 5, 1988, with the alterations introduced by consti-
tutional amendments no. 1/1992 through 64/2010 and by revision constitutional 
amendments no. 1/1994 through 6/1994). 
 17. PAULO BONAVIDES & ANTÔNIO PAES DE ANDRADE, HISTÓRIA 
CONSTITUCIONAL DO BRASIL 474 (3d ed., Paz e Terra 1991).  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 460.  
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Similarly, the participation of new political parties with progres-
sive views (especially the left and center-left) within the Constituent 
Assembly, and other social actors, such as unions, business confed-
erations and religious organizations, lent an interesting dynamic to 
the process of constitutional creation. This involved not only legiti-
mate claims, but also interests of particular groups, market reserves, 
and personal ambitions.20 
The work of almost two years of the National Constituent As-
sembly resulted in a text of 245 articles and in 70 articles of the 
Temporary Constitutional Provisions Act. Considered wordy, the 
Constitution addresses too many issues, is excessively detailed in 
some respects, and follows casuistry reasoning.21 It does not only 
focus on materially constitutional matters such as state organization 
and fundamental rights, but also emphasizes on many other issues, 
such as private relations questions. 
This new constitutional structure profoundly impacted Brazilian 
civil law, to such an extent that many of its institutions, with roots 
in the obsolete Civil Code of 1916, were reinterpreted and incorpo-
rated into the reality of the national community of the late twentieth 
century. 
Accordingly, the legal field of family law received special atten-
tion, as the family became the object of express constitutional safe-
guard, with special protection from the State.22 While in previous 
constitutional contexts such protection did not exist as a right, now 
the State began to govern family relationships in their various social 
manifestations and in line with several international treaties on the 
matter.23 
A major paradigm shift regarding family law occurred. On the 
one hand, there was the rapid collapse of the patriarchal model that 
                                                                                                             
 20. BARROSO, supra note 11, at 26.  
 21. Id. at 26-27.  
 22. CF 88, art. 226: “The family, which is the foundation of society, shall 
enjoy special protection from the State.” 
 23. PAULO LÔBO, FAMÍLIAS 1 (Saraiva 2008).  
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had prevailed in Brazil since colonial times;24 on the other hand, 
affective bonds became the center of family relationships. Family 
relations, now also based on affection, began to reflect the principle 
of solidarity, enshrined in article 3, I, of the 1988 Federal Constitu-
tion.25 
III. THE GAP BETWEEN THE 2002 CIVIL CODE AND SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION  
Those who had witnessed the advances in family law with the 
promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution found it difficult to 
believe the proposals contained in the second Civil Code of Brazil 
(2002). Its historical and sociological profile reflected the Brazilian 
family of the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, in this respect, the Civil Code 
was born significantly old.26 
Professor Miguel Reale, the supervisor of the revision and prep-
aration of the Civil Code, revealed in explanatory memorandum 
that: “[t]he Revision and Drafting Committee of the Civil Code, as 
it is noticeable, despite its constant efforts to adapt civil law to the 
demands of our time, always preferred to preserve the structure of 
the [civil] law now in force, enriching its titles with new institutions 
and representations.”27 
In addition, under a methodological perspective, Book IV (Fam-
ily Law) of the Special Part of the Civil Code has shown some flaws 
because of the (wholesome) division of the matter into the personal 
and patrimonial fields of family law: “[i]n fact this is the book of 
the current code that lacks systematic harmony the most. The chap-
ters do not always follow a strict logical development.”28 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id.  
 25. CF 88, art. 3, I: “The fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil are: I – to build a free, just and solidary society . . . .” 
 26. LUCAS ABREU BARROSO, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THEORY IN BRAZILIAN 
CIVIL LAW 12-13 (Kennedy Matos trans., Editora Juruá 2014).  
 27. Presidential Statement no. 160 from the President of Republic, Ernesto 
Geisel (June 6, 1975). 
 28. Id.  
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Nevertheless, the published text has some recognized innova-
tions. However, such advances did not have the power to keep civil 
law abreast of the social organization of the family, which was mov-
ing quickly towards the twenty-first century. This is because rele-
vant changes—such as (i) equality between men and women in fam-
ily affairs, (ii) the replacement of paternal power with family author-
ity, (iii) the expansion of the meaning and scope of child support, 
(iv) the possibility of changing the regime of property between 
spouses, (v) a renewed regulation for adoption and filiation, and (vi) 
the protection of homestead—did not manage to overshadow family 
relationships grounded in heterosexuality, monogamy, and the prev-
alence of marriage. 
The almost thirty years of legislative consideration were quite 
harmful to the regulatory framework designed for the novel encod-
ing of private life in Brazil: “[i]ts approval was both a political, legal 
setback and social regression, because during those three decades 
the new Code disregarded many of the changes occurring in the 
country.”29 
Effectively, a close analysis of the scenario of the presidential 
approval of the final draft of the Bill 634/1975 (turned into Law 
10,406/2002) reveals that the “final text with all the amendments 
adopted by the two federal legislative houses, and the Revision 
Committee, only shows the new Civil Code trying to keep pace with 
the social reality of our time.”30 
This is certainly true because several bills aimed at reforming it 
were soon submitted after its publication on January 11, 2002, some 
of them dealing with family relationships, a topic so sensitive to re-
actions between tradition and modernity in a democratic society 
with a conservative view. 
                                                                                                             
 29. JOSELI LIMA MAGALHÃES, DA RECODIFICAÇÃO DO DIREITO CIVIL 
BRASILEIRO 86 (Lumen Juris 2006).  
 30. JOSÉ SEBASTIÃO DE OLIVEIRA, FUNDAMENTOS CONSTITUCIONAIS DO 
DIREITO DE FAMÍLIA 335 (Revista dos Tribunais 2002).  
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Among the so-called large projects is the controversial draft 
Statute of Families31 (a bill introduced in 2007 and not yet adopted), 
which aims to remove from the Civil Code every rule related to fam-
ily law, forming an autonomous legal set, “concerned not only to 
ensure rights, but also realize them . . . .” by providing substantive 
rules and by governing procedural aspects and proceedings.32 After 
that, the idea of a family law micro system eventually gave rise to 
the proposal of other more comprehensive legislative projects, in-
spired by radically opposing ideological beliefs, particularly be-
tween religiosity and secularization. 
Instead of stimulating a second cycle of de-codification in Bra-
zil, several parliamentary initiatives on a smaller scale were intro-
duced before and after such statutes33 in order to make only specific 
changes in posited family law. The biggest confrontation, however, 
remains unresolved: will the codifying legislative technique prevail 
in Brazilian family law? Alternatively, will family law revive the 
“era of the statutes”?34 
Regardless of the outcome, what is at stake is not only a question 
of method. It has to do with family characteristics, with the plural-
ism of family organizations and family environments, with the 
recognition that “the Brazilian family changed significantly at the 
end of the twentieth century, not only regarding values, but also in 
terms of its composition.”35 
The Civil Code of 2002 called for a paradigm shift, but it was 
not quite what was observed through its critical reading.36 From the 
                                                                                                             
 31. Bill 2007, Statute of Families, https://perma.cc/J4WE-JRJE.  
 32. MÁRIO LUIZ DELGADO, CODIFICAÇÃO, DESCODIFICAÇÃO E 
RECODIFICAÇÃO DO DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO 452, 466 (Saraiva 2011).  
 33. Id. at 470-71; Regina Beatriz Tavares da Silva, Análise do Projeto de Lei 
do Estatuto das Famílias, 27 REVISTA DO INSTITUTO DOS ADVOGADOS DE SÃO 
PAULO 389-409 (2011).  
  34. Gustavo Tepedino, O Código Civil, os Chamados Microssistemas e a 
Constituição: Premissas para uma Reforma Legislativa, in PROBLEMAS DE 
DIREITO CIVIL-CONSTITUCIONAL 4 (Gustavo Tepedino ed., Renovar 2000).  
 35. LÔBO, supra note 23, at 10, 56.  
 36. LUCAS ABREU BARROSO, A REALIZAÇÃO DO DIREITO CIVIL: ENTRE 
NORMAS JURÍDICAS E PRÁTICAS SOCIAIS 23 (Juruá 2011).  
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intended change of individualism to social solidarity, what we saw 
was the continuity of a “strong presence of patrimonial interests over 
personal ones.”37 
Thus, the desire for democratization of the Brazilian civil law 
remained partially unfulfilled. Within the limits of this comment, 
such desire refers to the aspiration for a democratic family. On the 
other hand, the Federal Constitution of 1988 exerted influence on 
the infra-constitutional legislation and jurisprudence of local and 
higher courts (nationwide), which brought about a transformation of 
the model and the role of the Brazilian family in the transition to the 
third millennium. 
A great deal has already changed38 and many other things are 
changing.39 What is yet to change? It seems fair to say that “to 
achieve full democracy in family relations there is still much to do, 
even from a strictly legal point of view.”40 Domestic violence, 
equality and gender diversity, freedom and solidarity within the 
family, among many other topics, still challenge our jurists. 
The difficult path of the Civil Code of 2002 towards family de-
mocracy, far from any consensus, leads to its interpretation accord-
ing to the Federal Constitution of 198841 and beyond, to the under-
standing of what constitutes each Brazilian, individual or group, re-
cipients of the “personal achievement of affectivity, in coexistence 
and solidarity,”42 as basic functions of the present-day family. 
IV. THE RECOGNITION OF CIVIL SAME-SEX UNIONS BY THE 
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT  
On May 5, 2011, the Federal Supreme Court recognized same-
sex civil unions as family units by deciding both actions in a single 
                                                                                                             
 37. LÔBO, supra note 23, at 9.  
 38. See Maria Celina Bodin de Moraes, A Família Democrática, in NA 
MEDIDA DA PESSOA HUMANA: ESTUDOS DE DIREITO-CIVIL CONSTITUCIONAL 
217-21 (Maria Celina Bodin de Moraes ed., Renovar 2010).  
 39. Id. at 221-30.  
 40. Id. at 230.  
 41. Id. at 234.  
 42. LÔBO, supra note 23, at 14.  
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ruling, the ADI 4277 and the ADPF43 132.44 The Federal Supreme 
Court is the Brazilian Superior Court with the mission of judging 
the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of infra-constitutional 
legislation, through the control of diffuse and concentrated constitu-
tionality. The ADI and the ADPF are examples of concentrated con-
stitutional control. 
The Supreme Court examined article 1723 of the Civil Code45 
and articles 19, II and V, and 33 of the Statute for Civil Servants of 
the State of Rio de Janeiro (Statute for Civil Servants)46 in light of 
the Constitution. The goal was to avoid any outcome that differen-
tiated the legal protection of homo-affective civil servants from that 
given to heterosexual ones in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In the end, 
the Supreme Court considered same-sex civil unions constitutional, 
affirming them as a type of family that is constitutionally protected 
by Brazilian law. 
The following is a summary of the grounds for the decision 
(headnote can be found in the Appendix). The opinion of the Re-
porting Justice Ayres Britto, the first to vote, will be analyzed in 
more detail, but the highlights of all other justices’ opinions will also 
be examined. The Reporting Justice addressed the possibility of in-
terpreting article 1723 of the Civil Code and articles 19, items II and 
                                                                                                             
 43. Supremo Tribunal Federal, Glossário Jurídico, available at https://perma 
.cc/8PWB-BXDN: 
Allegation of Breach of Fundamental Precept (ADPF): It is a kind of 
action, filed exclusively with the Supreme Court, which has the purpose 
of preventing or repairing damage to a fundamental precept, resulting 
from an act of the administration. In this case, it is said that the ADPF is 
an autonomous action. However, this type of action can also have an 
equivalent nature to ADIs and could challenge the constitutionality of a 
provision before the Federal Constitution, but such a norm should be 
municipal or prior to the 1988 Constitution. The ADPF is regulated by 
Federal Law 9,882/99. The legitimate parties to file it are the same that 
may file an ADI. An ADPF is not appropriate where there is another type 
of action that may be filed (our translation). 
 44. ADPF 132, STF, 05.05.2011, https://perma.cc/FLY5-UFAV.  
 45. CC art. 1723: “A stable union between a man and a woman, evidenced 
by public, continuous and lasting cohabitation and established with the objective 
of constituting a family, is recognized as a family unit.” 
 46. Law 220/75.  
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V, and 33 of the Statute for Civil Servants, in conformity with the 
Constitution.  
The latest legislation of the State of Rio de Janeiro47 granted so-
cial security benefits equally to heterosexual and homosexual part-
ners, which prevented the ADI 4277 from being rejected due to lack 
of grounds. However, other subjective rights were denied to homo-
sexual partners, hence the possibility of trial in this case. 
In his opinion, the Reporting Justice points out that the Rio de 
Janeiro State law should be read in accordance with the Constitution 
and the Civil Code, for the purpose of recognition of homosexual 
unions as family units, as well as the rights and duties thereof. Thus, 
the requests made in the ADI 4277 were upheld. 
Justice Ayres Britto began by defining homo-affectivity as “a 
bond of affection and solidarity between same-sex couples or part-
ners.” He cited legal doctrine and joined the terms love, care, and 
affection as components of homo-affectivity. He stated that the un-
ion must be lasting, without setting a minimum time, socially con-
spicuous and with the intention of raising a family. He did not clar-
ify, however, what the evaluative words48 meant and whether they 
may be imposed by law. 
He also asserted that the word “sex,” used in articles 3, IV, 5, 
XLVIII, 7, XXX, 201, § 7, II, of the Constitution,49 has the sense of 
“anatomical and physiological non-coincident conformation be-
tween a man and a woman.” This rules out any possibility of legal 
inequality in relation to rights and duties of people of different sex, 
unless there is a reasoned justification for this. As such, article 3, IV 
of the Constitution prohibits discrimination against people based on 
sex. There was no further clarification of the meaning of the evalu-
ative word “inequality.” 
                                                                                                             
 47. Law 5,034/2007, art. 1. 
 48. On the importance of the densification of evaluative words, see Roberto 
Freitas Filho, Decisões Jurídicas e Teoria Linguística: o Prescritivismo Universal 
de Richard Hare, 178 REVISTA DE INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 19 (2008). 
 49. CF 88.  
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This idea embodies the “fraternal constitutionalism” advocated 
by Justice Britto in a book of his authorship and quoted in the deci-
sion. It is a constitutionalism “that turns to a community integration 
of people (not just to ‘social inclusion’), viable through the urgent 
adoption of public policies which affirm the fundamental civil and 
moral equality (more than just economic and social equality) of the 
social strata historically disadvantaged and even vilified.” 
Homosexual partners would be in this category and this means 
“full acceptance and subsequent experimentation of the socio-polit-
ical and cultural pluralism.”50 This respectful “coexistence of oppo-
sites” would be the basis of a substantive democracy, reinforcing the 
notion of lack of gender prejudice. The meaning of the term “sub-
stantive democracy” was not clarified. 
The Reporting Justice cited Kelsen’s negative norm, according 
to which “all that is not legally prohibited or required, is legally per-
mitted,” in conjunction with article 5 II of the 1988 Federal Consti-
tution, alluding that “no one shall be obliged to do or refrain from 
doing something except by virtue of the law.” 
Therefore, there is no law forbidding homosexual unions since 
the Constitution allows each person to behave according to their sex-
ual orientation. Justice Britto did not elaborate on the meaning of 
the evaluative word “freedom.” He just said it was a personality as-
set. Britto welcomed Jung’s idea that homosexuality is not a patho-
logical anomaly, but a psychic identity that individualizes the per-
son, ratifying sexual preference as an emanation of the principle of 
human dignity.51 He did not explain what he understands as “dignity 
of the human person.” He deals with human sexuality as a subjective 
right or an active legal situation and potestative right to intimacy and 
privacy52 without, however, elaborating on the sense of such insti-
tutions. To him, there is no constitutional provision prohibiting such 
                                                                                                             
 50. CF 88 art. 1, V.  
 51. CF 88 art. 1, III, & 60, § 4 (constitutional entrenchment clause). 
 52. CF 88 art. 5, X. The opinion thus defined the terms intimacy and privacy: 
“I - the right to intimacy may be viewed through the prism of abstention, or of the 
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freedom, which is a fundamental right and immediately applica-
ble.53  
He also held that articles 226 and 227 of the Federal Constitu-
tion, dealing with social order and family, outline a constitutional 
sense of family and give [the family] special protection “in its col-
loquial or proverbial meaning of domestic nucleus, regardless of 
whether formally or informally constituted or composed of hetero-
sexual couples or openly homosexual couples.” 
The family would be the primary place of realization of funda-
mental rights. So, to the Federal Constitution, according to the Re-
porting Justice: 
The equality between hetero-affective couples and homo-
sexual ones only gains full meaning if it flows into the same 
subjective right to the formation of an autonomous family. 
Such family is understood, in the context of the two legal 
subject typologies, as an independent domestic core and con-
stituted as a rule of visibility, continuity, and durability. 
As such, the decision states that there is no hierarchy between 
marriages and stable unions and allows civil marriage and adoption 
of children by homosexual couples. The Reporting Justice con-
cluded with the following remarks:  
I interpret art. 1723 of the Civil Code according to the Con-
stitution in order to exclude any meaning that prevents the 
recognition of a continuous, public and lasting union be-
tween persons of the same sex as a ‘family unit,’ which is 
understood as a perfect synonym of ‘family.’ Such recogni-
tion must be according to the same rules and with the same 
consequences as those of opposite-sex stable unions. 
Justice Luiz Fux was the second to speak. Here are the highlights 
of his opinion: (i) the application of the notion of protective duties—
objective dimension of fundamental rights (effectiveness of funda-
                                                                                                             
solitary enjoyment (onanism); II - the right to privacy may be seen through the 
angle of intercourse or coupled enjoyment (inter-subjectivity plane, therefore).” 
 53. CF 88 art. 5, I.  
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mental rights for the State and individuals). He refers to legal doc-
trine to explain such protection duties, through which the State acts 
to prevent violation of fundamental rights, as in the case of sexual 
orientation of minorities (homo-affective relations), (ii) he states 
that homosexuality is a fact of life and sexual orientation, that is, an 
individual’s personality characteristic, rejecting the taint that it is a 
disease, a belief or an ideology. Furthermore, homosexuality allows 
the formation of continuous, lasting unions of mutual assistance, the 
sharing of life projects, and Brazil had, in 2011, more than 60,000 
publicly declared homo-affective unions. In Brazilian law, there is 
no prohibition to establish homo-affective unions,54 and the regula-
tion given to the hetero-affective unions and marriages should be 
extended to homosexual unions55 for lack of distinction between the 
institutions (equality according to Dworkin and Alexy); (iii) family 
is above all love, but Justice Fux did not elaborate on the meaning 
of love or the requirements for a homosexual union; (iv) [he main-
tains] besides equality, private autonomy of individuals as the center 
of human dignity and Nancy Fraser’s recognition policy, allowing 
the achievement of life projects of homosexual persons (substantive 
equality), to also generate legal certainty to such individuals. Re-
quirements for a homosexual union must be substantiated. However, 
he did not deepen the understanding of referenced evaluative words, 
(v) he did not expressly mention adoption by homosexual couples 
and agreed with the Reporting Justice on this matter. 
The third opinion was by Justice Carmen Lúcia. The highlights 
of her views are as follows: (i) she maintained that, according to 
Bobbio, we are in the time of realization of rights conquered, such 
as the exercise of freedom. She equated values to principles, without 
explaining the meaning of each evaluative word; (ii) she accepted 
homosexual unions “under the canopy of the Constitution that bases 
                                                                                                             
 54. CF 88 art. 5, II.  
 55. CF 88 art. 226. 
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its normative pillars on the principle of human dignity, which re-
quires tolerance and harmonious coexistence of all, with full respect 
to the free choices of individuals.” Again, she did not explain the 
evaluative words, neither did she explain the meaning assigned to 
equality, intimacy and social pluralism, which were some of the 
foundations that she used for the admission of homosexual unions; 
(iii) she agreed with the solution proposed by the Reporting Justice 
without expressly dealing with marriage and adoption by homosex-
ual couples. 
The major points of Justice Ricardo Lewandowski’s opinion, the 
fourth to speak, are: (i) the description of family as an entity consti-
tuted by marriage in the Brazilian Constitutions of 1937, 1946, 1967 
and in Constitutional Amendment 1/1969 was not confirmed by the 
Constitution of 1988; (ii) according to the Constitution, infra-con-
stitutional texts, and the National Constituent Assembly debates, he 
asserts that same-sex unions do not fit the molds of marriage, stable 
unions and one-parent family. However, it is possible to constitute 
a stable homosexual union, with its own format, by applying the 
technique of integration of the Portuguese constitutionalist 
Canotilho; (iii) the roster of article 226 of the Federal Constitution 
of 1988 is exemplary, giving rise to the upholding of the claims in 
the action, “so that the legal provisions to heterosexual stable unions 
be applied to homosexual unions characterized as family entities, 
excluding those provisions that require the diversity of sex to their 
exercise until specific rules governing such relations arise;” (iv) he 
agreed with the solution proposed by the Reporting Justice and did 
not clarify the evaluative words nor did he confront the foundations 
of previous opinions. 
Justice Joaquim Barbosa was the fifth to speak: (i) he mentioned 
the role of the Constitutional Courts to bridge the gap between law 
and society, based on the work of Aaron Barak; (ii) he said that the 
gap between positive law (lack of legislation favorable to the recog-
nition of same-sex marriage) and reality must be overcome by the 
Supreme Court, and that there is not in the Constitution of 1988 any 
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prohibition of the recognition intended, which emanates from the 
dignity of the human person; (iii) he stated that the Federal Consti-
tution of 1988 dealt with substantive equality and non-discrimina-
tion, but he did not elaborate on the evaluative words he used 
throughout his vote; (iv) he agreed with the solution proposed by the 
Reporting Justice, although he did not mention marriage and adop-
tion expressly. 
From the opinion of Justice Gilmar Mendes, the sixth judge to 
rule, one can infer: (i) the concern to define the meaning of interpre-
tation according to the Constitution, seeking to avoid any interpre-
tation of article 1723 of the Civil Code that would prohibit recogni-
tion of homosexual union; (ii) he stresses the role of the Supreme 
Court in judging the action due to the legislator’s omission regarding 
the matter, protecting the rights of minorities because each individ-
ual has the right to self-development. He supports his arguments by 
using the Basic Law of Bohn (the Constitution of Germany), the 
principle of equality and comparative law; (iii) based on the Consti-
tution,56 he also accepted stable homosexual unions by using an 
open interpretation grounded in the theory of Peter Häberle; (iv) he 
addressed the problems of evaluative gaps and possible thought, cit-
ing specific doctrine; (v) he concluded with the following words:  
Therefore, at this point, I merely recognize the existence of 
the union between persons of the same sex, based on legal 
foundations distinct from those explained by Justice Ayres 
Britto. And grounded in the theory of possible thought, I de-
termine the application of a similar protection model—in 
this case, the one which deals with stable unions—where ap-
plicable, in accordance with the reasoning presented here 
without addressing other developments. 
(iv) he also accepted the solution proposed by the Rapporteur, but 
did not give meaning to all the evaluative words used in his opinion, 
such as freedom and equality. 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id.  
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Justice Ellen Gracie, the seventh judge to express her views, 
fully agreed with the Reporting Justice’s opinion and did not submit, 
therefore, a written opinion. 
In the opinion of Justice Marco Aurelio, the eighth judge to give 
a ruling, one can observe: (i) the confirmation of prejudice experi-
enced by homosexuals as a population of 18 million people, bring-
ing up the English experience on the possibility of homosexual un-
ion; (ii) based on Hart he criticizes the idea of collective morality or 
that of an ordinary person and highlighted, among others, Hart’s ar-
guments in the English debate:  
First reason: to punish someone is to cause them harm, and 
if the offender’s attitude did not cause harm to anyone, pun-
ishment is meaningless. In other words, the private conduct 
that does not affect the rights of third parties is within the 
sphere of private autonomy, free from government interfer-
ence. Second reason: free will is also an important moral 
value. Third: freedom enables learning resulting from exper-
imentation. Fourth: the laws that affect individual sexuality 
entail harm to individuals subject to them, with very serious 
emotional consequences. 
(iii) he also highlighted that “morality and the law should have dif-
ferent criteria, but go together. The law is not fully contained in mo-
rality, and vice versa, but there are points of contact and approach;” 
(iv) he emphasized the lack of political will on the part of Congress 
to discuss the issue in spite of the numerous bills introduced, which 
did not generate any specific legislation. The solution has to stem 
from the fundamental rights,57 from the reinterpretation of the mean-
ing of family, from the Brazilian historicity and legal doctrine, and 
from the principle of human dignity, through the counter-majoritar-
ian role of the courts in ensuring fundamental rights; (v) he decided 
for “the applicability of the regime of stable union to same-sex un-
ions,” agreeing with solutions proposed by the Rapporteur, without 
dealing explicitly with adoption and marriage in these situations and 
without delving into the meaning of evaluative words in his opinion. 
                                                                                                             
 57. CF 88 art. 226, §3. 
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In the opinion of Justice Celso de Mello, the ninth judge to pro-
nounce, one reads: (i) the importance of the intervention of amicus 
curiae to pluralize discussion of the topic and allow the Supreme 
Court to “have of all the necessary elements for the resolution of the 
dispute, enabling it, with such procedural openness, to overcome the 
serious issue relevant to the democratic legitimacy of the decisions 
emanating from this Court;” (ii) he stressed the legislative historicity 
imposed by Portugal when colonizing Brazil until the Military Penal 
Code, which was always discriminatory toward homosexuals; (iii) 
that this treatment before the 1988 Federal Constitution cannot exist, 
which allows for “the recognition by constitutional imperative, of a 
stable homosexual union as a legitimate family unit,” which pre-
vents discrimination and realizes the values of liberty, equality, legal 
certainty and non-discrimination based on legal doctrine and judg-
ments of the Supreme court and other Brazilian courts. There was 
no explanation of the evaluative words used; (iv) about the counter-
majoritarian role of the judiciary in the defense of fundamental 
rights and protection of minorities through a substantive perspective 
of a constitutional democracy. There was no explaining of the eval-
uative words used, except for the meaning of substantive democracy 
(based on the works of Geraldo Ataliba and Ferreira Pinto); (v) he 
emphasized the right to the pursuit of happiness as derived from 
constitutional principles such as the dignity of the human person, 
without showing it, but citing the Supreme Court rulings on the mat-
ter and rulings from the United States and foreign constitutions; (vi) 
[he regarded] affection as value / constitutional principle and family 
shaper, and [he also mentioned] the “Yogyakarta Principles: the 
right to constitute a family, regardless of sexual orientation or gen-
der identity” in order to address the legislative omissions (unconsti-
tutional) so as to equate stable unions with homosexual unions; (vii) 
he accepted the solutions proposed by the Rapporteur without ex-
plicitly dealing with marriage and adoption. 
From the opinion of the tenth and last judge, Justice Cezar 
Peluso, who was the Chairman of the Supreme Court at the time of 
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this judgment, one gathers: (i) the wording of art. 1723 of the Civil 
Code and article 226, § 3 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 author-
izes the interpretation according to the Constitution, removing the 
exclusion of homosexual union as a kind of family, but with its own 
configuration, which differs from stable unions. Stable union rules 
may be applied to same-sex unions but only similarly; (ii) after the 
present judgment, action on the part of the legislative branch is re-
quired; (iii) he agrees with the proposed solution by the Rapporteur 
[as to marriage and adoption], and did not explain the evaluative 
words in his opinion. 
V. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ADI 
4277 RULING 
After the Supreme Court decision was published, the normative 
hypothesis of article 1723 of the Civil Code gained amplitude be-
cause stable same-sex and opposite-sex unions were equated, and it 
is now unconstitutional to make any distinction between such types 
of family formation. 
It is important to remember the erga omnes effectiveness given 
to the decision by article 102, § 2, of the Constitution, as well as its 
binding effect on the State, judicial or administrative structure58 that 
have to be fully committed to the content of the ruling. 
As direct repercussions of the judgment of ADI 4277, two major 
controversies took the legal stage, both related to civil marriage: (a) 
the refusal by clerks and judges to perform the conversion of stable 
same-sex union into full marriage; (b) the denial of marriage li-
censes to people in same-sex relationships. 
                                                                                                             
 58. CF 88 art. 102:  
The Federal Supreme Court is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding 
the Constitution, and it is within its competence: […] Paragraph 2 Final 
decisions on merits, pronounced by the Supreme Federal Court in direct 
actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of constitutionality 
shall have force against all, as well as a binding effect, as regards the 
other bodies of the Judicial Power and the governmental entities and en-
tities owned by the Federal Government, in the federal, state, and local 
levels. 
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It is obvious that homosexual partners with legal status duly rec-
ognized would see themselves fully entitled to request the conver-
sion of their stable union into civil marriage, as provided in article 
226, § 3 of the Federal Constitution59 and article 1726 of the Civil 
Code.60 
However, bureaucratic and often ideological obstacles in the 
process of conversion of a stable union into civil marriage eventu-
ally made the latter be the preferred route for the consolidation of 
love life, even among people of the same sex. The constitutional 
provision of article 226, § 3, ordering the facilitation of this conver-
sion was not observed by many courts of the federal states. Thus, 
such conversion became less expeditious than direct marriage. 
Nevertheless, given the countless denials of marriage licenses to 
homosexual partners, there arose the need to confirm the extent of 
the judgment handed down by the Supreme Court. The debate 
reached the Superior Court of Justice61 through the Special Appeal 
1183378,62 which was upheld. Same-sex partners were then author-
ized to obtain marriage licenses. 
In his opinion, the reporting justice, Luis Felipe Salomão, states 
that the Brazilian Civil Code provisions do not textually ban same-
sex marriage, and, therefore, one cannot in any way envision any 
implied prohibition to the solemnization of marriage without fron-
tally contradicting the constitutional principles previously invoked 
in the Federal Supreme Court decision. 
                                                                                                             
 59. CF 88 art. 226:  
The family, which is the foundation of society, shall enjoy special pro-
tection from the State . . . . For purposes of protection by the State, the 
stable union between a man and a woman is recognized as a family en-
tity, and the law shall facilitate the conversion of such entity into mar-
riage. 
 60. CC art. 1726: “A stable union may be converted into marriage, upon ap-
plication to a judge by the companions and registration in the Civil Register.” 
Translation based on LESLIE ROSE, O CÓDIGO CIVIL BRASILEIRO EM INGLÊS/THE 
BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE IN ENGLISH (2d ed., Renovar 2012).  
 61. Translator’s note: The Superior Court of Justice is the highest appellate 
court in Brazil for non-constitutional issues concerning both state and federal or-
dinary courts. 
 62. REsp 1183378, STJ, 01.02.2012, https://perma.cc/X9TV-WDFR.  
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Although the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice only 
binds the parties of the legal procedural relationship, as a unifying 
Court of jurisprudence, its decision had a great impact on the various 
similar cases being heard across the country, establishing itself as a 
true paradigm decision. 
Nonetheless, the results of the ADI 4277 and the Special Appeal 
1183378, in addition to the decisions that eventually were consoli-
dated in the courts of the federal states, remained insufficient to en-
sure the conversion of stable homosexual union into civil marriage 
and the granting of licenses to marriage, which continued to be in-
sistently denied to homosexual couples. 
It is worth mentioning that, although subject to the supervision 
of the judiciary, the notaries of the Civil Registry of Natural Persons 
are not part of the direct or indirect public administration. Still, no-
taries are regimentally and legally compelled to comply with deter-
minations issued by the Supreme Court and the Superior Court of 
Justice. Therefore, it is unconstitutional and not prudent to refuse 
the conversion to marriage and the licenses to direct marriage. 
Even within the Judiciary Commissions of State Appellate 
Courts, there was no uniformity in interpreting the extent of the 
judgment of ADI 4277, especially regarding the possibility of reali-
zation of civil same-sex marriage. 
Such resistance against the outcome of ADI 4277 required the 
issuing of Resolution 17563 by the National Council of Justice64 on 
May 14, 2013, during its 169th Plenary Session. 
This normative act was explicitly aimed to prohibit the refusal 
of the license and civil marriage solemnization to same-sex couples, 
                                                                                                             
 63. Resolução 175, 05.14.2013, https://perma.cc/NHH4-N65R. 
 64. The National Council of Justice (CNJ) is a public institution that aims to 
improve the work of the Brazilian judicial system, especially with regard to the 
control and administrative procedural transparency. It was created as an external 
control body, in order to standardize the internal procedures of the Judiciary and 
provide strategic planning to magistrates, with assignments which are primarily 
administrative, financial and disciplinary, as set forth in the Constitutional 
Amendment 45/2004, commonly called the “Judiciary Reform.” 
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as well as the denial of the conversion of stable homosexual union 
into marriage. 
If practiced, these acts will give rise to an immediate report to 
the Judge-inspector [member of the Judiciary Commission] who 
will take appropriate action in the face of the concrete case, to ensure 
the full realization of these rights, even with the possibility of certain 
penalties. 
With the entry into force of Resolution 175 (based on item I of 
§ 4 of article 103-B of the Constitution), which took place two days 
after its publication, same sex civil marriages were widely licensed 
around the country, ending any infertile debate on the issue. Like-
wise, permissions for the conversion of stable homosexual union 
into civil marriage were broadly granted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It can be said that the Supreme Court in this historic judgment, 
albeit belated and conservative, defended the national constitution-
alism from biased and exclusionary discourses that sought to inter-
pret the Federal Constitution of 1988 as a static text, disconnected 
from the factual and legal reality. 
These discourses, however, failed to prevent the realization of 
the principles of equality (elimination of discriminatory factors that 
nullified the recognition of a new family entity) and freedom (posi-
tive freedom: free exercise of sexual orientation) as the basis of a 
stable union (and, later, marriage) between persons of the same sex 
in the Brazilian constitutional civil law. 
Some negative events permeated the lives of homosexuals and 
homo-affective families before, during, and after the case. Certain 
social groups, mainly of a religious nature, opposed the rights of 
same-sex couples. 
For instance, in 2011, statements of Congressman Jair Bolsonaro 
and the well-known Evangelical Pastor Silas Malafaia compared ho-
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mosexuality to zoophilia and necrophilia.65 In 2011, before the Su-
preme Court decision, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Fed-
eral Deputy Marco Maia also said it was not yet time for the Brazil-
ian National Congress to discuss issues such as abortion and homo-
sexual unions.66 Still in 2011, the newspaper O Globo reported that 
a cohabiting homosexual couple needed to go through four registry 
offices in Curitiba (Paraná state capital) to be able to register their 
homosexual union. This was the case after the Supreme Court deci-
sion.67 
Earlier reports show that in Brazil between 3768 and 7869 rights 
were denied to cohabitating homosexuals in stable unions. For ex-
ample, (i) they could not combine incomes to approve financing; (ii) 
they were unable to register their partners as dependents in the pub-
lic service; (iii) they did not participate in state programs related to 
family; (iv) they could not move with the public servant partner 
transferred to another location; (v) they had no right to inheritance; 
(vi) they could not file income tax returns jointly; (vii) they had no 
usufruct of the partner’s assets; (viii) and they did not enjoy immun-
ity from seizure of the property where the couple resides. The Bra-
zilian legal system by not granting the same rights to homosexuals 
considerably raised the cost of living for these individuals and their 
families.70 These problems were discussed at the Supreme Court, 
                                                                                                             
 65. Bianka Carbonieri, Silas Malafaia Compara Homossexualidade com 
Zoofilia e Necrofilia, SAPATOMICA, https://perma.cc/B9FN-94N7; Bianka Car-
bonieri, Uma geral pelo “caso Bolsonaro,” SAPATOMICA, https://perma.cc 
/5RMH-L38G. 
 66. O Globo, É A Hora de DiscutirTemas Como Aborto e União Homosexual, 
March 14, 2011, https://perma.cc/7V7T-GZYH. 
 67. O Globo, Casal Homosexual Só Consegue Registrar Uniao Pasar por 
Quatro Cartorios em Curitiba, May 5, 2011, https://perma.cc/RTE6-ZVVU.  
 68. MARIA BERENICE DIAS, UNIÃO HOMOSSEXUAL: O PRECONCEITO E A 
JUSTIÇA (Livraria do Advogado 2000). 
 69. Associação Brasileira de Gays, Lésbicas, Bissexuais, Travestis e Tran-
sexuais [Brazilian Association of Gays, Lesbians and Transvestites], 78 direitos 
negados a casais homoafetivos, https://perma.cc/GY8A-5X32 (now offline).  
 70. Eloi Rodrigues Pethechust Barreto & Oksandro Osdival Gonçalves, 
Análise Econômica da Homossexualidade: Custos e Benefícios do Comporta-
mento Sexual na Perspectiva do Direito Brasileiro, 18 REVISTA JURÍDICA DA 
PRESIDÊNCIA 409, 419-20 (2016).  
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but even after the ruling, these rights continue to spark heated de-
bates. 
In addition, many cases of gender violence were recorded. In 
2013, the Annual Report on the Murder of Homosexuals in Brazil—
LGBT71 revealed the following: (a) that there were about 312 mur-
ders of gays, transvestites and lesbians as a result of homophobia, 
that is, one murder every 28 hours; (b) when it comes to homicide 
due to sex discrimination, the murder of gays ranks highest with 186 
homicides (59 %), followed by 108 transvestites (35%), 14 lesbians 
(4%), 2 bisexuals (1%) and 2 heterosexuals (1%); (c) that 10 homo-
sexuals committed suicide due to homophobia, as in the case of a 
16-year-old who hanged himself at home because his parents did not 
accept his homosexual orientation; (d) that Brazil led the world 
ranking of homo-transphobic crimes registering in 2013 with the 
killing of 108 transsexuals, while in the United States, a country 
with a population one hundred million more than that of Brazil, ex-
perienced 16 murders of transgender people in the same year. Brazil 
has a homicide risk of transvestites 1,280 times higher than in the 
United States. 
It stands out, finally, that there is no federal law regulating ho-
mosexual union in Brazil, although there is no shortage of bills un-
der consideration in Congress on the matter, some of them propos-
ing setbacks.72 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 71. Grupo Gay Da Bahia—GGB, Relatório Anual de Assassinato de Ho-
mossexuais no Brasil—LGBT, 2013, https://perma.cc/SG4Y-QF4J.  
 72. Bill 470/13, which provides for the Statute of Families, recognizing the 
stable union as “a family unit . . . between two people, characterized by the public, 
continuous, lasting cohabitation and established with the purpose of starting a 
family;” Bill 5.120/13 to recognize civil marriage and stable union between peo-
ple of the same sex; Bill 6.583/13 (Statute of the Family) intended to establish by 
law the recognition of the family as “family entity formed from the union between 
a man and a woman through marriage or stable union, and the community formed 
by either parent and their children.” 
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APPENDIX 
The following is the headnote of the Supreme Court ruling, which 
decided the actions ADI 4277 and ADPF 13273: 
1. Allegation of Breach of Fundamental Precept (ADPF). Partial 
loss of object. The remaining part accepted as Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality. Homosexual Union and its recognition as 
legal institution. Convergence of objects between actions of ab-
stract nature. Joint decision. Adoption of the foundations of 
ADPF No. 132-RJ for ADI No. 4277-DF, in order to give an 
interpretation according to the Constitution to article 1723 of the 
Civil Code. Requirements for the action met. 
2. Prohibition of discrimination again persons based on sex, be it 
in the dichotomy man/women (gender), or based on sexual ori-
entation of either of them. Prohibition of prejudice as part of fra-
ternal constitutionalism. Tribute to pluralism as a socio-political 
and cultural value. Freedom of sexual expression, within the cat-
egory of fundamental rights on individual, which is an expres-
sion of the autonomy of the will. Right to intimacy and private 
life. Eternity clause. The gender of individuals, unless there is a 
constitutional provision expressed or implied to the contrary, is 
not a factor of legal difference. Prohibition of prejudice in the 
light of item IV of art. 3 of the Federal Constitution. Prejudice 
frontally collides with the constitutional purpose of promoting 
the good of all. Normative silence of the Constitution regarding 
the actual sexual expression of individuals based on Kelsen’s 
negative norm: that which is not legally prohibited or required, 
is legally allowed. Recognition of the right to sexual preference 
as a direct emanation of the principle of human dignity: the right 
to self-esteem in the highest point of the individual’s conscious-
ness. Right to the pursuit of happiness. Normative leap from the 
                                                                                                             
 73. The language of Brazilian court decisions headnote is rather telegraphic. 
The translator tried his best to make it understandable in English. See ADI 4277, 
supra note 3; APDF 132, supra note 44. 
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prohibition of prejudice to the proclamation of the right to sexual 
freedom. The concrete sexual expression is part of the natural 
persons’ freedom of choice. Empiric expression of sexuality on 
the planes of constitutionally protected intimacy and privacy. 
Freedom of will. Eternity clause. 
3. Constitutional provision for the family institution. Recognition 
that the federal constitution does not lend to the noun ‘family’ 
any orthodox meaning or that of the legal technique. Family as 
a socio-cultural category and spiritual principle. Subjective right 
of family formation. Non-reductionist interpretation. The caput 
of art. 226 gives the family, the foundation of society, special 
state protection. Constitutional emphasis on the family institu-
tion. Family in its colloquial or proverbial meaning as a house-
hold core, regardless of whether formally or informally consti-
tuted or formed by hetero affective couples or homosexual ones. 
The 1988 Constitution when using the term ‘family’ does not 
limit its formation to opposite-sex couples, nor to a notary for-
mality, a civil solemnization or a religious liturgy. Family as a 
private institution that is voluntarily constituted between adults 
and maintains a necessary trichotomous relationship with the 
State and civil society. The family unit is the main institutional 
locus of realization of fundamental rights, which the Constitu-
tion denotes as intimacy and privacy (item X of art. 5). The ison-
omy between heterosexual couples and homosexual ones only 
gains full meaning if it flows into the same subjective right to 
form an autonomous family. Family as the central figure or re-
ceptacle, of which everything else is content. Imperious need of 
non-reductionist interpretation of the concept of family as an in-
stitution that is also formed through different routes rather than 
civil marriage. Progress of the 1988 Federal Constitution in 
terms of customs. Advance towards pluralism as a social-politi-
cal-cultural category. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to main-
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tain interpretatively the constitutional text fundamentally coher-
ent, which involves the elimination of prejudice against sexual 
orientation. 
4. Stable union. Constitutional norms that refer to men and women, 
but only to give special protection to give special protection to 
the latter. The constitutional aim is to establish legal relations 
that are horizontal and without hiearchy between the two human 
genres. The constitutional definition of the concepts of family 
unit and family. The constitutional reference to the basic duality 
man and woman in § 3 of its art. 226 is due to the primary pur-
pose of not missing the slightest opportunity to promote legal 
horizontal relationships without hierarchy within domestic soci-
eties. Normative reinforcement to a more efficient fight against 
the patriarchal reluctance of Brazilian customs. Impossibility of 
the use of the Constitution text to revive article 175 of the Char-
ter of 1967/1969. It is impossible to roll the head of the art. 226 
on the gallows of its third paragraph. Provision using the termi-
nology ‘family unit’ did not intend to differentiate it from ‘fam-
ily.’ There is no hierarchy or legal quality difference between 
the two forms of constitution of a new autonomized and domes-
tic core. The use of the term “family unit” as a perfect synonym 
for “family.” The Constitution does not forbid family formation 
by persons of the same sex. Affirmation of the judgment that a 
person is not prohibited of anything, only in light of a right or a 
legitimate protection of the interest of others, or of the whole 
society, which is not the case sub judice. Inexistence of the right 
of heterosexual individuals to its legal non-equivalence with ho-
mosexual individuals. Applicability of § 2 of art. 5 of the Federal 
Constitution, to show that other rights and guarantees not ex-
pressly listed in the Constitution, emerge from the system and 
the principles adopted by it, verbatim: The rights and guarantees 
expressed in this Constitution do not exclude others deriving 
from the regime and from the principles adopted by it, or from 
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the international treaties to which the Federative Republic of 
Brazil is a party.  
5. Lateral differences for the grounds of the decision. Note that Jus-
tices Ricardo Lewandowski, Gilmar Mendes and Cezar Peluso 
agree on the impossibility of an orthodox fitting of homosexual 
union into the constitutionally established family types. Never-
theless, they recognized the union between same-sex partners as 
a new form of family unit. The matter is open to legislative con-
formation, without prejudice to the recognition of immediate ap-
plicability of the Constitution. 
6. Interpretation of art. 1723 of the Civil Code in accordance with 
the Federal Constitution (technique: interpretation according to 
the constitution). Recognition of homosexual union as family. 
Actions upheld. Due to the possibility of a prejudiced or discrim-
inatory interpretation of article 1723 of the Civil Code, not re-
solvable in the light of its own, it is necessary to use the tech-
nique of interpretation according to the Constitution. This is to 
delete from the provision any meaning that prevents the recog-
nition of a continuous, public and lasting union between persons 
of the same sex as a family. Recognition according to the same 
rules and with the same consequences as those of the opposite-
sex stable unions. 
 
 
